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1. INTRODUCTION 
On February 25, 1986, dictator Ferdinand Marcos and his wife 
Imelda fled the Philippines for Hawaii, the result of a civilian up-
rising caused by discontent under his rule. 1 His successor, President 
Corazon Aquino, has tried to institute various reforms to repair the 
years of neglect and corruption of the Philippine government cre-
ated during Marcos' rule. 2 Among these reforms is the Commission 
on Good Government. 
The Commission, chaired by former Philippine Senator J ovito 
Salonga, has among its purposes "[t]he recovery of all ill-gotten 
wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his 
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, 
whether located in the Philippines or abroad .... "3 To achieve the 
Commission's goals" ~he Philippine government has brought suits 
I N.Y. Times, Feb. 26,1986, at I, co1.6. 
2 N.V. Times, Aug. 27,1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 30. 
3 Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 347, n.2, (2nd Cir. 1986) (quoting 
Executive Order No. I (1986», cert. dismissed sub nom. Ancor Holdings, N.V. v. Republic of 
the Philippines, 107 S.Ct. 1597 (1987), cert. denied sub nom. New York Land Co. v. Republic 
of the Philippines, 107 S.Ct. 2178 (1987). 
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in United States courts to recoup real property allegedly taken 
improperly by the Marcoses, their family and associates.4 Also, since 
the Marcoses' arrival in the United States, citizens of the Philippines 
and the United States have independently sued Marcos in American 
courts, alleging various human rights claims.5 
In this spate of litigation against Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, 
two cases stand out. Recently two federal circuit courts reached 
conflicting decisions on similar claims initiated by the Philippine 
government to recover property allegedly usurped by the Marcoses 
through the abuse of their power as leaders of the Philippines.6 
Specifically, the courts were inconsistent in their interpretation of 
the act of state doctrine. The implications of such a conflict are 
enormous. In a judicial context, this conflict leaves future courts in 
a precedential bind, unsure of the correct interpretation of the act 
of state doctrine. Moreover, the political and diplomatic conse-
quences of the conflict are immeasurable. The relationship between 
the Philippine and American governments, which is of economic 
and strategic importance to both,7 is indirectly affected by the in-
4 Marcos, 806 F.2d at 344, Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 
1987), reh'g granted, 832 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1987). 
5 See e.g., Sison v. Marcos, No. 86-0225 (D. Hawaii 1986), appeal docketed, No. 86-2496 
(9th Cir. 1986), Hilao v. Marcos, No. 86-390 (D. Hawaii 1986), appeal docketed, No. 86-2449 
(9th Cir. 1986), and Trajano v. Marcos, No. 86-0207 (D. Hawaii 1986), appeal docketed, No. 
86-2448 (9th Cir. 1986), where plaintiffs alleged that Marcos had approved acts of murder, 
torture, kidnapping and detention. These claims were dismissed by District Court Judge 
Harold Fong in Honolulu and have been appealed. Further action is pending the en banc 
decision of the Ninth Circuit in the Marcos case. Also, in Ortigas v. Marcos, No. C 86-0975 
(N.D. Cal. 1987), appeal docketed, No. 87-1706 (9th Cir. 1987) and Clemente v. Marcos, No. 
C 86-1449 (N.D. Cal. 1987), appeal docketed, No. 87-1707 (9th Cir. 1987), plaintiffs alleged 
human rights abuse claims. District Court Judge Spencer Williams of the Northern District 
of California dismissed these claims. These cases have been linked to the above cases for 
appeal, since they have already been briefed. In Estate of Domingo v. Philippines, No. C 82-
1055V (D. Wash. 1982), Marcos and Philippine intelligence agents were charged in a 1981 
murder of two dissidents by their decedents. Although granted immunity from liability in 
1982, Marcos has been deposed twice. The trial is scheduled for April, 1989. See also Alien 
Tort Claims Act - Act of State Doctrine - Act of State Doctrine Requires Dismissal of Human Rights 
Claims Brought Against Former Philippine President Residing in the United States, 27 VA. j.INT'L 
L. 433 [hereinafter Haron). 
Marcos has also been indicted by a federal prosecuter on charges that he fraudulently 
acquired Manhattan real estate valued at hundreds of millions of dollars. N.Y. Times, October 
22, 1988, at 1, col.4. 
6 The cases are Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2nd Cir. 1986), cert. 
dismissed sub nom. Ancor Holdings, N.V. v. Republic of the Philippines, 107 S.Ct. 1597 (1987), 
cert. denied sub nom. New York Land Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, 107 S.Ct. 2178 (1987) 
[hereinafter Second Circuit) and Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 
1987), reh'g granted, 832 F.2d lllO (9th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Ninth Circuit). 
7 See Declaration of Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 
25 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 407-09 (1986). 
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consistency. The domestic strength of the Aquino government is 
also affected, along with the positions of Marcos loyalists and other 
Philippine dissenters. 
This Note analyzes the legality and political importance of the 
Aquino government's pursuit of real property in the United States 
controlled by the Marcoses. First, the history of the act of state 
doctrine will be briefly discussed. Second, the use of the act of state 
doctrine in the Marcos cases will be examined, as well as the courts' 
interpretations of the doctrine in those cases. The reasons for the 
inconsistent interpretations of the doctrine and important legal is-
sues not considered by the courts will then be raised. This Note 
concludes by reporting on and advocating suggestions for legislation 
or treaties, including the International Emergency Economic Pow-
ers Act, that may facilitate the pursuit of fleeing dictators' assets. 
II. THE CASES BROUGHT BY THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT TO 
RECOVER PROPERTY 
In the two principal actions brought by the Aquino government 
to recover property, the Philippines sought to stop the Marcoses 
from selling any of the contested property. In Republic of Philippines 
v. Marcos,s the Second Circuit unanimously affirmed the district 
court's judgment granting a preliminary i~unction in favor of the 
Philippine government.9 The injunction restrained the alienation 
of five pieces of real property located in New York. The defendants 
were corporations owning the properties in question as well as the 
Marcoses and some of their associates, who allegedly are the bene-
ficial owners of the properties. 1O 
The Aquino government alleged in its complaint that a con-
spiracy existed by which property was acquired by or for the Mar-
coses' benefit but placed in the names of others. 11 Financing for the 
property purchases allegedly came from assets stolen from the Phil-
ippine government. 12 The complainants further alleged that an 
i~unction was necessary to restrict the defendants from liquidating 
the property and further dissipating the government's money. 13 The 
8806 F.2d at 344. 
91d. at 361. 
101d. at 347. The Marcoses defaulted in this case as well as in the Ninth Circuit litigation. 
See P. Weiss, Remarks at the American Society of International Law 1987 Conference (April 
9-11,1987). 
II /d. at 348-51. 
12Id. at 348. 
"ld. at 348-49. 
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plaintiffs sought the injunction pending the determination of the 
true ownership of the land. 14 
The district court granted the preliminary injunction, finding 
irreparable harm to the plaintiffs and probable ownership by the 
Marcoses.15 After finding federal jurisdiction over the matter, the 
Second Circuit affirmed, imposing a constructive trust on the prop-
erty.16 The court rejected the defendants' defenses of a lack of 
standing or justiciability, the act of state doctrine, lack of due pro-
cess, sovereign immunity and forum non conveniens. 17 The defen-
dants' petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court was denied. ls 
In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos,19 a similar complaint was 
brought by the Aquino government in the Ninth Circuit. Unlike 
the Second Circuit claim, this complaint did not seek the recovery 
of specific property exclusively but rather of all wealth allegedly 
obtained by the Marcoses through the commission of various de-
predations while in power.20 The complaint made eleven claims, 
three of which were based on the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO).21 The other eight claims, which included 
fraud, theft, and expropriation, were pendent.22 
The plaintiffs claimed that the Marcoses abused their authority 
by converting government property to their family and associates. 23 
The complaint also alleged that the Philippine government under 
14Id. at 349. 
15 New York Land Co. v. Republic of Philippines, 634 F. Supp. 279, 281-283, (S.D.N.Y. 
1986). 
16 806 F.2d at 355. 
17Id. at 344-61. 
18 Marcos, cert. dismissed sub nom. Ancor Holdings, N.V. v. Republic of the Philippines, 
107 S.Ct. 1597 (1987), cert. denied sub nom. New York Land Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, 
107 S.Ct. 2178 (1987). 
19 818 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1987), reh'g granted, 832 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1987). 
2°Id. at 1475-76. 
21Id. at 1477. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § § 1961-
68 (1982). The purpose of the statute as stated in Section 1 of Pub. L. 91-452 is "to seek the 
eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the 
evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing en-
hanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in 
organized crime." 
22818 F.2d at 1476. The concept of pendent jurisdiction has to do with a party's simul-
taneous assertion of claims resting on both federal and state law. It is applied when a federal 
court's jurisdiction depends on the nature of the claim being asserted, i.e., a federal question. 
If such a claim is asserted the court also has jurisdiction to determine any claim by that party 
which is based on state law and arises out of the same fact situation. See F. JAMES & G. 
HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 62 (3rd. ed. 1985). 
23 818 F.2d at 1476. 
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Marcos' rule constituted a RICO enterprise engaged in a pattern of 
racketeering activity, including mail and wire fraud and knowing 
transportation of stolen goods in foreign commerce.24 In contrast 
with the Second Circuit case, this complaint sought the freezing and 
eventual return of property located throughout the world. 25 
The district court granted the plaintiffs' request for a prelimi-
nary injunction to freeze the property to prevent its liquidation, 
ruling that RICO established a basis for federal jurisdiction. 26 The 
injunction was based on the plaintiffs' pendent claims for a con-
structive trust and accounting. 27 The court held that the plaintiffs, 
as in the Second Circuit, had a substantial likelihood of prevailing 
on the merits, and that irreparable harm would be caused by not 
prohibiting alienation of the property.28 
The Ninth Circuit court overruled the district court. The court 
believed there was little likelihood of success on the merits and that 
the act of state doctrine precluded plaintiffs' claims. 29 In dissent, 
Judge Nelson wrote that this case was indistinguishable from the 
Second Circuit case, and liberally borrowed from that case to sup-
port his argument.30 The plaintiffs petitioned for a rehearing en 
banc, and the petition was granted on November 16, 1987.31 The 
case was reargued before the Ninth Circuit on February 10, 1988. 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND TO THE MARCOS CASES: THE ACT OF 
STATE DOCTRINE 
The act of state doctrine was succinctly announced by the 
United States Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez. 32 In Under-
hill, the plaintiff was an American citizen working in Venezuela as 
an engineer. After the revolution in Venezuela, he was prohibited 
for a short period of time by the new government from returning 
to America. When he did return, he brought suit in America against 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 1475-76. 
25 Id. at 1477. 
27 Id. A constructive trust is a device used by courts to force someone who holds a 
property interest unfairly to transfer it to its rightful holder. It is a tool of equity to satisfy 
the demands of justice. As such, courts have broad discretion in its application and breadth. 
See generally G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (2d ed. revised 1978). 
28 818 F.2d at 1477. 
29 Id. at 1490. 
30/d. at 1492-1502. 
31 832 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1987). 
32 168 U.S. 250 (1897). 
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the revolutionary government, which had been recognized by the 
United States.33 The Supreme Court refused to uphold Underhill's 
claim that he was unlawfully detained by the Venezuelan revolu-
tionary government, reasoning that "[e]very sovereign State is 
bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, 
and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts 
of the government of another done within its own territory."34 The 
doctrine's rationale was derived from the principle of comity be-
tween countries that is pervasive in international law.35 
Although the Supreme Court has modified the act of state 
doctrine somewhat since Underhill, the doctrine remains basically 
the same.36 For example, an exception was developed to the doctrine 
that implicitly recognized separation of powers issues that result 
from the use of the doctrine. In Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres 
Societe Anonyme,37 Judge Learned Hand applied the act of state 
doctrine in refusing to set aside the forced taking of the Jewish 
plaintiff's property by the Nazis during World War II. But, in a 
later case filed by the same plaintiff, Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-
Amerikaansche Stoomvart -Maatschappij,38 the Second Circuit changed 
its position after the State Department informed it by letter that the 
United States' foreign relations did not require judicial abstention 
in cases involving Nazi confiscations.39 This case came to be known 
as the "Bernstein exception," a principle by which the State De-
partment can explicitly indicate that the conduct of American for-
eign relations does not require the application of the act of state 
doctrine in a given case. 
The Bernstein exception has been questioned by the Supreme 
Court in recent years. In First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional 
de Cuba,40 the Supreme Court agreed to adjudicate the legality of a 
33 Id. at 251. 
34Id. at 252. 
350etjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918). However, there is wide-
spread uncertainty about the precise origin and rationale for the doctrine. See Chow, Rethink-
ing the Act of State Doctrine: An Analysis in Terms of Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 62 WASH. L. REV. 
397 (1987). Chow's thorough analysis points out that many scholars agree that the exact 
origin of the doctrine is uncertain, and its changing rationale is muddled. Id. at 408 n.64, 
412-430. See also Note, Adjudicating Acts of State in Suits against Foreign Sovereigns: A Political 
Question Analysis, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 722 (1983). 
36 Marcos, 818 F.2d at 1482, n.4 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 
398,416 (1964)). 
37 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). 
38 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). 
39Id. at 376. 
40 406 U.S. 759 (1972). 
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Cuban taking of American-owned property in Cuba when the State 
Department wrote to the Court that the act of state doctrine need 
not apply. Although a majority of the Court found the doctrine 
inapplicable, only a minority expressly recognized the Bernstein 
exception by treating the State Department's suggestion as conclu-
sive.4! 
Other recent Supreme Court decisions have also altered the act 
of state doctrine. For example, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabba-
tino,42 the Supreme Court recognized the act of state doctrine as an 
element of federal common law designed to avoid interference with 
the executive's conduct of foreign relations while protecting the 
integrity of the judiciary.43 The Court acknowledged the caution 
expressed by Professor Philip C. Jessup by stating that "rules of 
international law [and, by implication, the act of state doctrine] 
should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state inter-
pretations."44 Indeed, allowing all courts to comment and impact 
on America's international relations could have disastrous conse-
quences as well as violate the domain of the legislative and executive 
branches of government. Therefore, the Sabbatino decision recog-
nized that issues involving America's foreign relations must be ex-
clusively treated under federal law and are justiciable in federal 
courts. 
Sabbatino involved the use of the act of state doctrine by the 
Supreme Court to refuse to adjudicate the validity of an uncom-
pensated taking of American-owned property in Cuba by the Cuban 
government.45 The Court noted that although the doctrine's ration-
ale had '''constitutional' underpinnings," it was not explicitly re-
quired by the Constitution.46 The Court applied the doctrine be-
41 [d. at 768. Justices Rehnquist, White and Chief Justice Burger adopted and approved 
the Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine. They reasoned that since the Executive 
Branch is charged with the conduct of our foreign affairs, an express statement to the Court 
concerning a foreign affairs issue should be followed. They stated that this was "no more 
than an application of the classical common-law maxim that '[tJhe reason of the law ceasing, 
the law itself also ceases.'" Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 288 (4th ed. 1951)). Justice 
Douglas, also part of the plurality, stated that the Bernstein exception did not apply because 
"[oJtherwise, the Court becomes a mere errand boy for the Executive Branch which may 
choose to pick some people's chestnuts from the fire, but not others." [d. at 773. Justice 
Powell, concurring in the judgment, refused to acknowledge the Bernstein exception because 
it conflicts with the separation of powers doctrine. [d. 
42 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
43 [d. at 423-25. 
44 !d. at 425. 
45 [d. at 439. 
46 !d. at 423. 
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cause the American government had already taken a position on 
the Cuban takings, so adjudication risked embarrassment to the 
executive branch.47 However, by limiting the act of state doctrine's 
application to takings of property by a foreign sovereign within its 
own territory, the Court did not completely forfeit its right to ad-
judicate takings issues involving foreign relations.48 
In a more recent decision, the Supreme Court questioned both 
the Bernstein exception as well as the act of state doctrine itself. In 
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,49 a claim was made 
by former and current owners (the Cuban government) of a com-
pany nationalized by Cuba to recover payments for goods shipped 
by the company before the nationalization. 50 The State Department 
wrote, in essence, two general Bernstein letters that questioned the 
need for the act of state doctrine in any circumstances and suggested 
that adjudication of cases such as this would not injure America's 
foreign relations. 51 The Court retained the doctrine, but four jus-
tices argued that it did not apply to a foreign sovereign's commercial 
acts, including acts done within its own territory. 52 These justices 
reasoned that embarrassment and conflict, the major underpinnings 
of the doctrine, would more likely result if the doctrine were used 
in this case to refuse to adjudicate the repudiation of a foreign 
government's debts which arose from its operation of a purely 
commercial business. 53 
Because of these decisions, the status of the Bernstein exception 
is unclear. In Sabbatino, the Court expressly avoided endorsing the 
exception, and a majority of the Court questioned its continued 
vitality in First National. Also, the Dunhill Court clouded the signif-
icance of the Bernstein letter by rejecting the executive branch's 
suggestion that the act of state doctrine was no longer necessary. 
IV. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE AS USED BY THE MARCOSES 
The act of state doctrine is the most critical issue of both Marcos 
cases. In both cases, the courts considered whether the doctrine 
47Id. at 402-03, 423. 
48 " ••• [W]e decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking 
of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized 
by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement 
regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violated 
customary international law." Id. at 428. 
49 425 U.S. 682 (1976). 
50Id. at 685-86. 
51Id. at 706-15. 
52Id. at 695. 
53Id. at 698 (Burger, C.J., Powell, White and Rehnquist, JJ.). 
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prevents American courts from adjudicating the claims of the 
Aquino government because they involve acts of a foreign sover-
eign.54 Although there are material differences between the two 
cases, the application of the doctrine is the same in both. 
Intuitively, the Marcoses' situation seems to be ideally suited to 
the act of state doctrine because they were recognized foreign gov-
ernment leaders. However, the Aquino government's claims allege 
that the Marcoses obtained vast amounts of property and wealth 
through the abuse of their positions and actions beyond the scope 
of their authority. These actions, therefore, would not be recognized 
as those of a foreign power but rather as those of private individuals. 
The Marcoses claim that the act of state doctrine prohibits adjudi-
cation of these claims. That is, American courts would have to 
adjudicate the acts of a sovereign state (the Marcos government) in 
order to entertain this claim. If this claim was accurate, it would 
clearly be within the scope of the act of state doctrine; regardless 
of the illegality of the alleged acts, the act of state doctrine would 
apply. 55 
The key difference between the Ninth and Second Circuits' 
interpretations of the act of state doctrine concerns whether the 
disputed actions of the Marcoses were acts of the sovereign state or 
were private acts for personal gain. 
A. The Public/Private Dichotomy 
The differentiation between public and private acts in the realm 
of the act of state doctrine is best illustrated by the case of Jimenez 
v. Aristeguieta.56 The former president of Venezuela was charged by 
the then existing Venezuelan government with financial crimes and 
involvement in a murderY The Venezuelan government brought 
these charges in American federal courts to extradite Aristeguieta, 
who was living in the United States.58 Aristeguieta's defense in-
cluded a claim that the contested acts were not justiciable by the 
United States courts because they were in exercise of sovereign 
authority or acts of state.59 The circuit court rejected this act of state 
doctrine defense, stating that the doctrine only applies when of£1-
54 806 F.2d at 357-60, 818 F.2d at 1481-89. 
55 See Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 114 F.2d 438, 444 (2d 
Cir. 1940). See infra text accompanying notes 67-71. 
56 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied sub nom. Jimenez v. Hixon, 373 U.S. 914, reh'g 
denied, 374 U.S. 858 (1963). 
57Id. at 552. 
58Id. 
59Id. at 553. 
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cials having sovereign authority act in an official capacity.60 The acts 
"constituted common crimes committed by the Chief of State [Ar-
isteguieta] done in violation of his position and not in pursuance of 
it. They are as far from being an act of state as rape which appellant 
concedes would not be an 'Act of State."'61 The Jimenez court thus 
suggested that an act not commonly recognized as an act of state 
done for public benefit is not protected by the doctrine. 
The Supreme Court affirmed a distinction analogous to the 
distinction between public and private acts under the act of state 
doctrine in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba. 62 The 
Court distinguished between the public acts of a foreign sovereign 
and commercial acts of sovereigns committed in the course of their 
purely commercial operations.63 The Court ruled that the act of 
state doctrine did not protect such commercial acts.64 The Court 
reasoned that embarrassment would more likely result if the doc-
trine were used to prohibit the Court from adjudicating the oper-
ation of a purely commercial business by a foreign government.65 
The Court underscored language from the Sabbatino and Underhill 
opinions to develop this distinction.66 
While Dunhill's public/commercial distinction is not altogether 
identical to the Philippines' public/private distinction in the Marcos 
cases, it lends credence to the Philippine claims by acknowledging 
a distinction between public and private acts. Arguably, the public/ 
commercial distinction is precisely the focus of the Philippines' 
RICO claims in the Ninth Circuit, since RICO entails an organiza-
tion engaged in a pattern of commercial, racketeering activity. That 
is, in order to satisfy the Dunhill distinction, it could be argued that 
the alleged actions of the Marcoses were commercial actions distinct 
from public actions. 
6°Id. at 557. 
61 Id. at 558. 
62 425 U.S. at 682. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53. 
63Id. at 695. 
64 Id. However, only four Justices concurred in that portion of the opinion which refused 
to allow the act of state doctrine to be applied to commercial acts of a foreign sovereign. 
Thus, the weight of this distinction is arguable. 
65Id. at 698. 
66 The Court stated "[i]n describing the act of state doctrine in the past we have said that 
it 'precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a 
recognized foreign power committed within its own territory,' Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 401 [emphasis added by Court], and that it applies to 'acts done within 
their own States, in the exercise of governmental authority.' Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 
at 252 [emphasis added by Court]." 
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Additionally, courts have been careful to emphasize that the 
legality of the contested acts under foreign law is irrelevant to the 
determination of the application of the doctrine. In doing so, they 
have highlighted the semantic difficulty in determining what is a 
public or sovereign act. For example, in Banco de Espana v. Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York,57 the doctrine was used to bar an action 
to recover silver allegedly diverted from the Spanish government 
by deposed government officials, allegedly by means of illegal secret 
decrees. 58 The court held that the act of state doctrine is not limited 
to acts which are valid under foreign law59 and that it was irrelevant 
that the new government itself requested the adjudication in our 
courts.70 Further, the court reasoned that "so long as the act is the 
act of the foreign sovereign it matters not how grossly the sovereign 
has transgressed his own laws."7! 
This holding creates semantic difficulties because it is unclear 
what constitutes an "act of the foreign sovereign." At least two 
meanings are possible. First, it could mean that any action taken by 
a government official is an act of the sovereign. Second, the phrase 
could refer to only those acts within the realm of duty of the 
sovereign, as distinguished from private acts. The Banco de Espana 
court adopted the former, broader perspective. It stated that "[b]y 
a 'governmental act' is meant no more than a step physically taken 
by persons capable of exercising the sovereign authority of the 
foreign nation."72 This definition appears to conflict with the Jimenez 
court's implicit definition of a public governmental act as an act 
within recognized parameters of official behavior. 
In the Marcos cases, the Second Circuit adopted the Jimenez 
interpretation of the public/private act dichotomy. However, the 
court stated that Banco de Espana supported Jimenez by interpreting 
acts of a foreign sovereign as a reference to acts done within the 
realm of duty of the sovereign. 73 The Marcos court in the Second 
Circuit conveniently overlooked the Banco de Espana court's broad 
interpretation of governmental acts, a point brought up by the 
defendants in their appeal to the Supreme Court.74 However, the 
67 114 F.2d at 438. 
68Id. at 443. 
69Id. at 444. 
7°Id. 
71Id. 
72Id. 
73 806 F.2d at 358-59. 
74 Brief for Appellant at 23, New York Land Company v. Republic of the Philippines, 
cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 2178 (1987). 
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Banco de Espana case was distinguished by the New York Federal 
District Court that adjudicated the Marcos case.75 District Court 
Judge Pierre Leval stated that Banco de Espana was "barely appli-
cable" to the Marcos case since that case concerned the legitimacy 
of acquisition of property in a foreign country, and not the issue of 
whether to give effect to Philippine governmental decrees.76 Judge 
Leval reasoned that Banco de Espana is probably more helpful to the 
plaintiffs than to the defendants since it instructed American courts 
to honor foreign governmental decrees altering ownership of prop-
erty of foreign subjects.77 The Second Circuit did not refer to this 
distinction in its opinion. 
The Second Circuit equivocated in holding that an official act 
is an act of a foreign sovereign. The court reached this conclusion 
by stating that Jimenez and Banco de Espana are in concert, an im-
proper decision in light of the fact that the cases conflict. Although 
the Second Circuit stated its support of the Jimenez precedent, its 
actual holding is less clear. Instead of equivocating, the court should 
have developed a benefit test for acts to determine whether acts are 
public or private. The Jimenez court implicitly articulated a benefit 
test by emphasizing that acts for personal benefit are not immunized 
from judicial review by the act of state doctrine. A benefit test avoids 
the semantic difficulties created in trying to determine "acts of a 
foreign sovereign," "official capacity," and other phrases used by 
the Jimenez and Banco de Espana courts. Thus, a benefit test does 
not merely rephrase the public/private act question but rather sim-
plifies it. 
In light of all of this precedent, the Ninth Circuit's interpre-
tation of this issue in Marcos is curious. The court admitted that the 
alleged acts of Marcos and Jimenez were similar, but reasoned that 
Jimenez is distinguishable on the grounds that judicial review in that 
case was based on an extradition treaty in which the political 
branches "expressly contemplated judicial review of the official's 
actions."78 
In dissent, Judge Nelson criticized the majority's distinction of 
the Jimenez case by noting the irrelevance of the grounds on which 
75 Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, No. 86-2294 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1986) (order 
denying stay of discovery). The Banco de Espana opinion was distinguished by the district 
court during the defendants' motion to suspend discovery while the original preliminary 
injunction decision was appealed to the Second Circuit. 
76 [d. 
77 [d. 
78 818 F.2d at 1485 n.12. 
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it was made. 79 The relevance of Jimenez to the Marcos cases is simply 
its articulation of a distinction between the public and private acts 
of a sovereign leader. Indeed, as Judge Nelson pointed out, "the 
existence of a treaty [as in Jimenez] is [only] relevant to the separate 
question of embarrassment of our executive branch .... "80 
The factual similarities between the Jimenez case and the Marcos 
cases compel an application of the Jimenez public/private act distinc-
tion to the Philippine claims. Since Judge Kozinski, writing for the 
majority in Marcos in the Ninth Circuit, admitted that if Marcos 
"entered the public treasury at gunpoint and walked out with money 
or property belonging to the Philippines, he would not be protected 
by the act of state doctrine,"81 it follows that actions which were 
apparently taken by the Marcoses for personal gain should have 
been considered as unofficial as those defined in Jimenez. This anal-
ysis is especially true when considering the fact that the proceedings 
were only at the preliminary injunction stage. Thus it would be 
premature to apply the act of state doctrine before the discovery 
stage proceeded and facts could be obtained to determine fairly the 
applicability of the act of state doctrine. 
In concert with the public/private act dichotomy of the act of 
state doctrine is the principle advanced by the Supreme Court that 
the justification for the doctrine grows weaker when the adminis-
tration that is challenged in court is no longer in power.82 The 
Supreme Court, in announcing its holding in Sabbatino that it could 
not examine any Cuban expropriation of property in Cuba, stated 
that conditions can change this principle. These conditions include 
the importance of the action to our foreign relations and the con-
tinued reign of the accused government.83 
Taking these conditions into consideration, there is ample jus-
tification for refusing to apply the act of state doctrine to the Mar-
coses. Since the Marcoses are no longer in power, there is little 
danger of interference with United States foreign relations in ad-
judicating claims against them. Indeed, American relations with the 
Philippines would be strengthened by hearing the Aquino govern-
ment's claims.84 The Second Circuit recognized this consequence of 
79Id. at 1494 n.4. 
8°Id. 
81Id. at 1485. 
82 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. 
83Id. 
84 25 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 409 (1986). 
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the Marcos litigation,85 yet the Ninth Circuit did not.86 The Ninth 
Circuit rejected this point for fear that it would raise foreign rela-
tions concerns. As an example, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the 
Philippine political balance and the American foreign policy process 
could suffer if the Aquino government's claims were to be ad judi-
cated.87 Such a presumption is contrary to the Supreme Court's 
discussion of conditions of the act of state doctrine in Sabbatino. 
This presumption also defeats the doctrine's purpose of removing 
political acts from judicial consideration by engaging in political 
prediction.88 The Ninth Circuit should have taken the facts as they 
existed in considering this point rather than engaging in political 
postulation. The fact that the Marcoses are not in power weakens 
the grounds on which the Marcoses can claim the act of state doc-
trine as a defense. 
B. Embarrassment, Foreign Relations and the Act of State Doctrine 
1. Introduction 
Although the subissue of embarrassment of American foreign 
relations has been infrequently discussed in act of state doctrine 
case history, it is important because it strikes at the reason for the 
doctrine's existence. While the rationale for the doctrine has been 
changed by the Supreme Court from one of comity to one of 
separation of powers,89 the principal purpose for the doctrine, that 
the government speak with one voice concerning foreign relations, 
has remained the same.90 However, it should be noted that most of 
the cases applying the doctrine concern nationalization.91 Thus, the 
applicability of the cases to the embarrassment issues in the Marcos 
cases is unknown. A court could reasonably rule that principles 
developed in nationalization cases are inapposite to issues raised in 
the Marcos cases. 
85 806 F.2d at 359. 
86 818 F.2d at 1485-86. 
87 [d. at 1486-87. 
88 See supra text accompanying notes 32-36. 
89 Chow, supra note 35, at 412-16. This reasoning has come under recent criticism. [d. 
at 421-30. 
90 Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47,50 (1965). 
91 Haron, supra note 5, at 438-39. 
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The conduct of American foreign relations is entrusted to the 
executive and legislative branches under the Constitution.92 Because 
of this separation of powers, the act of state doctrine developed to 
prevent judicial interference with the foreign affairs duties of the 
other two branches of government.93 The doctrine expresses the 
Supreme Court's belief "that its engagement in the task of passing 
on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than 
further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the 
community of nations as a whole in the international sphere."94 
Thus, it is important for the American government to speak with 
one voice concerning its foreign relations. The judicial branch 
should be precluded from interfering in America's foreign relations 
at inopportune moments.95 
With this doctrine in mind, courts must necessarily consider 
the impact of their decisions on American foreign relations. Im-
properly timed decisions can severely damage sensitive international 
relations, perhaps irreparably.96 However, courts are clearly not 
precluded from deciding claims with foreign relations conse-
quences.97 Since the text of the Constitution does not require the 
act of state doctrine, the judiciary's capacity to review the validity 
of the acts of a foreign sovereign state is not irrevocably removed 
by the doctrine.98 In short, the doctrine acts as a brake but not as 
an impediment to judicial review of foreign acts of state. 
The Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine allows 
courts to be more sensitive to foreign relations concerns. By ac-
cepting policy statements from the State Department, courts can 
make more informed decisions and defer to the executive branch 
when necessary. However, recent Supreme Court decisions have 
92 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, d. 3; art. II, § 2, d. 2. See also Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 
246 U.S. 297 (1918). "The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed 
by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative - 'the political' - Departments of the 
Government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power 
is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision." 246 U.S. at 302. For a historical review of the 
separation of powers see Bestor, S~paration of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Intent 
of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 527 (1974), Notes On Presidential 
Foreign Policy Power (Part 1): The Framers' Intent and the Early Years of the Republic, 11 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 413 (1982). For a modern perspective of presidential foreign relations power see 
Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1972). 
93 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423. 
94Id. 
95 See Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 50 (1965). 
96 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 436. 
97Id. at 423. 
98Id. 
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questioned the importance and relevance of the exception, conse-
quently leaving it as an optional consideration.99 
2. The Embarrassment Subissue in the Marcos Cases 
Despite its statements to the contrary,lOO the Ninth Circuit con-
sidered the embarrassment of American foreign relations a major 
issue in its analysis of the Marcos case, as did the Second Circuit in 
its opinion. Their differing views highlight the judicial restraint the 
Ninth Circuit exhibited in prior litigation,lOl as well as the Ninth 
Circuit's serious misinterpretation of America's relationship with 
the Philippines. l02 
An important difference between the two cases is the involve-
ment of the Justice Department and the State Department in the 
Second Circuit case but not in the Ninth Circuit case. In the Second 
Circuit the Justice Department, with the concurrence of the State 
Department's Office of the Legal Advisor, argued "with respect to 
the act of state doctrine the burden is on the party asserting the 
applicability of the doctrine, that [the] defendants [Marcoses] have 
to date not discharged their burden of proving acts of state, and 
that, as to the allegations of head of state immunity, the defendants 
do not have standing to invoke the doctrine."103 This argument, in 
essence, functions as a Bernstein letter instructing the courts that 
the act of state doctrine should not apply because there is no danger 
to America's foreign relations. l04 
The Second Circuit also referred to a statement made by Mi-
chael Armacost, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs.l05 
The Armacost declaration was made on March 15, 1986 and sub-
mitted to the United States Court of International Trade for a suit 
before that court. 106 The statement is a thorough declaration of the 
99 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
100 Marcos, 818 F.2d at 1488 n.20. 
101 See International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 
1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). See also infra text accompanying 
notes 115-18. 
102 See infra text accompanying notes 105-30. 
103 Marcos, 806 F.2d at 356-57. 
104Id. at 357. 
I05Id. at n.3. See 25 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 407-09 (1986). The statement was 
not submitted by the State Department for this case, but was included as part of the court 
record. 
106Id. It was also submitted in the case of Azurin v. von Raab, 803 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 
1986). That case concerned a dispute over the ownership of currency, jewelry and other 
valuables seized by the U.S. Customs Service upon the arrival of Ferdinand Marcos and his 
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economic, political, military and social ties between the Philippines 
and the United States. 107 The declaration also refers to the Aquino 
government's Commission on Good Government. Undersecretary 
Armacost stated: 
it is in the foreign policy interests of the U.S. Government to 
honor the Philippine Government's request and our commit-
ment to fulfill it at the earliest possible time. I believe the Aquino 
Government will view our actions on this matter as an important 
indicator of the future course of our bilateral relations. I believe 
that the favorable development of these relations is vital to the 
foreign policy of the United States. lOS 
Since the Armacost declaration falls within the boundaries of the 
Bernstein exception, the court was within its bounds when denying 
the Marcoses the act of state doctrine. The declaration serves as a 
Bernstein exception because it is an express comment of the State 
Department on litigation affecting American foreign relations. 
The Ninth Circuit received no such statements from the Justice 
Department or the State Department. lOg Yet despite the strong sim-
ilarity between the two cases, the Ninth Circuit refused to apply the 
Armacost declaration to its case. 110 The court explained at length 
its reasoning for not accepting the declaration. 11 1 Fearful of handing 
down a decision in the future that could injure American foreign 
policy at that time, the court said it would not "embark upon such 
an endeavor" absent express encouragement from the appropriate 
government voice.ll2 The court also said it would not accept the 
"generalization" that the Armacost declaration applies to litigation 
similar to that in the Second Circuit. 113 The court believed that the 
reference to the Armacost declaration by the Second Circuit was 
entourage in Hawaii on February 26, 1986. The Aquino government requested that the 
property not be released until its ownership could be determined. Azurin brought suit against 
the Customs Service, seeking a writ of mandamus compelling Customs to release the property. 
ld. at 994-95. District Court Judge Harold M. Fong granted the writ, but was overruled by 
the Ninth Circuit. Id. See United States Customs Service's Authority to Detain Property Claimed by 
Former Philippine President Marcos: Azurin v. Von Raab [sic], 23 STANFORD J. INT'L L. 683 (1987). 
107 25 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 407-09 (1986). The declaration also refers to 
the historical relationship between the two countries, the $3.7 billion in bilateral trade between 
the two countries, as well as cultural exchanges, agreements, and military cooperation existent 
between the Philippines and the United States. 
IOBld. 
109 818 F.2d at 1487. 
llO ld. at 1487-88. 
lllld. 
112ld. at 1487. 
113ld. 
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"far too nebulous to permit sweeping inferences about the position 
of the executive branch."114 
In this decision the Ninth Circuit relied in part on a case it had 
previously decided that also invoked the act of state doctrine.ll5 In 
International Association of Machinists v. OPEC,1I6 a labor union 
brought suit against the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) seeking monetary and injunctive relief for al-
leged price fixing of crude oil prices in violation of the Sherman 
Act. Although the Machinists case deals with a different factual 
situation than the Marcos cases, it offers a persuasive argument for 
judicial caution in deciding matters affecting America's foreign re-
lations that is remarkably similar to the argument advanced in the 
Ninth Circuit Marcos case. 117 The Machinists court strongly empha-
sized the need for the judiciary to refrain from interfering in po-
litical affairs, specifically recognizing the courts' limited focus and 
the necessity of making decisions on the basis of legal principles. 1I8 
This line of reasoning forms the basis of the Ninth Circuit's 
claims in the Marcos case that the potential for embarrassment pre-
cludes a decision for the Aquino government. llg Yet, ironically, 
Judge Nelson, the only justice to participate in both decisions, was 
part of the unanimous Machinists court but dissented in the Marcos 
case. Stating that the Armacost declaration and the facts of the case 
precluded any sense of judicial overlapping into the political realm, 
Judge Nelson emphasized the importance of the Armacost decla-
ration and speculative nature of the majority opinion. 120 
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit's majority opinion in Marcos is unduly 
arbitrary and conclusory concerning the subissue of embarrassment 
to the United States executive branch. The following paragraph is 
indicative of the court's confused view of the issue. 
We cannot shut our eyes to the political realities that give rise 
to this litigation, nor to the potential effects of its conduct and 
resolution. Mr. Marcos and President Aquino represent only 
two of the competing political factions engaged in a struggle 
for control of the Philippines. While the struggle seems to be 
114Id. 
115 !d., (citing International Association of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 
1981).) 
116 649 F.2d 1354. 
117Id. at 1358-59. 
118Id. at 1358. 
119 818 F.2d at 1486-87. 
12°Id. at 1496-98. 
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resolving itself in favor of President Aquino, this may not be 
the end of the matter. Only four years ago, the tables were 
turned, with Mr. Marcos in power and Mrs. Aquino and her 
husband in exile in the United States. While we are in no po-
sition to judge these things, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that the pendulum will swing again, or that some third force 
will prevail. What we can say with some certainty is that a 
pronouncement by our courts along the lines suggested by 
plaintiff would have a substantial effect on what may be a del-
icate political balance, as would a contrary pronouncement ex-
onerating Mr. Marcos. 121 
99 
While thoughtful issues are raised in this statement, its basis is 
contrary to the act of state doctrine and the facts of the case. In 
addition, its conclusions are arbitrary. First, President Aquino has 
been recognized by the United States as the leader of the Philippine 
government,122 and has received political, economic and military 
support for the government. 123 Second, although there has been 
political strife in the Philippines (mostly after this decision and 
involving communists, not Marcos loyalists),124 there is no "struggle" 
in the anarchic sense the court suggests. Third, while the court says 
"we are in no position to judge these things ... ," it nevertheless 
arbitrarily states that since Marcos may return to power it should 
abstain from the matter. 125 This is precisely the reason that the act 
of state doctrine exists. The doctrine precludes courts from having 
to adjudicate foreign relations matters of a sovereign state. 126 The 
court did not have to predict the future as it did here, because 
potential embarrassment would have been a sufficient reason to 
invoke the doctrine. Instead, the court tenuously engaged in polit-
ical prediction by saying that the "pendulum" might swing again, 
resulting in a decision of this subissue for the Marcoses. 
The weakness of the majority opinion is highlighted in Judge 
Nelson's dissent. Regardless of the probability that the predictions 
made by the majority might actually occur, Judge Nelson observed 
that "it is not clear why the m~ority believes that such potential 
embarrassment would outweigh the certain, immediate embarrass-
121Id. at 1486. 
122 25 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 408 (1986). 
123Id. Armacost's statement indicates that the Philippine government received $251 
million in military assistance in 1980-85 as well as $226 million in economic aid in 1985. 
124 See e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. II, 1987, at 5, col. I; Feb. 13, 1987, at 15, col. I; Feb. 14, 
1987 at 3, col. 1. 
125 806 F.2d at 1485-86. 
126 First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 769 (1972). 
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ment in our relations with the current Philippine government if our 
courts were to shut the door to the Philippines' request for adju-
dication of the claims."[emphasis added]l27 The majority is guilty 
of just such questionable decisionmaking. It overlooked the present 
relationship between the Philippines and the United States by in-
terpreting future Philippine political conditions. This interpretation 
is contrary to the purpose of the act of state doctrine, which is based 
on the relations between countries and not the instability of sover-
eign states. 128 
In addition, the Ninth Circuit used an incorrect analysis of the 
act of state doctrine by considering what it thought to be Philippine 
"political realities." Instead of having to predict the course of Phil-
ippine government,129 the court had a thorough, relevant statement 
of relations between the American and Philippine governments 
available in the Armacost declaration. Even though the Armacost 
declaration was made in the course of another case,130 it nonetheless 
is a statement from both governments of the political realities be-
tween the two countries. To the extent that the court found it 
necessary to consider political realities in balancing the political 
interests at hand, the Armacost declaration was a far superior source 
than any factual interpretation it could develop on its own. 
In reasoning that the lack of a Bernstein letter or other state-
ment from the State Department weighed against its adjudication 
of plaintiff's claims, the Ninth Circuit relied too heavily on the 
Bernstein exception and ignored Supreme Court criticism of the 
exception. In one case, a majority of the Supreme Court questioned 
the continuing use of the Bernstein exception,131 and in another 
case the Court expressly avoided endorsing it. 132 Thus, the Bern-
stein exception is far from a mandatory requirement in cases in-
volving foreign relations issues. At most, it is a persuasive, optional 
consideration. The Ninth Circuit exaggerated its importance, how-
ever, by refraining to adjudicate this matter because of the lack of 
a statement from the executive branch. The substantial similarities 
between the Ninth Circuit and Second Circuit cases, along with the 
expansive liberal statements of the State Department in these prior, 
similar instances point towards an acceptance of them by the Ninth 
127 818 F.2d at 1496. 
128 See supra text accompanying notes 32-36. 
129 818 F.2d at 1485-86. 
130 See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text. 
131 See First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). 
132 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 420 (1964). 
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Circuit. Even though the court refused these statements, the op-
tional status of the Bernstein exception does not serve as grounds 
for rejecting a case solely because a Bernstein-type statement was 
not made. 
V. OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES IN THE MARCOS CASES 
A. The Standard for a Preliminary Injunction 
In both its Second and Ninth Circuit claims, the Aquino gov-
ernment sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the transfer of 
the property in question. Aside from the differences in the two 
complaints, the injunction issue highlighted confusion amongst the 
federal judges in the Ninth Circuit, each of whom prescribed a 
different test for the injunction. 133 The proper test is clear, given 
the differences in the claims advanced. 
In the Ninth Circuit, Judge Kozinski adopted a "conduct" test134 
in which he concluded that the act of state doctrine precluded the 
Philippine government from showing a likelihood of success on the 
merits. 135 Judge Hall, concurring in the judgment but dissenting on 
this issue, adopted an "effect" test from RICO litigation. 136 RICO 
was the basis for federal jurisdiction in the case, and its language is 
concerned with the effects of activity prohibited by the statute in 
the United States. Judge Hall concluded that since the effect of the 
Marcoses' conduct in the United States was not a significant element 
of the plaintiffs' claim, an injunction was unavailable. 137 In dissent, 
Judge Nelson adopted an equitable balance test based on the pen-
dent claims since the RICO claims were not the basis for the district 
court's preliminary injunction. 138 The Second Circuit, which denied 
the application of the act of state doctrine to the defendants, also 
developed an equitable balance test in which the probability of harm 
to the plaintiffs and their likelihood of success were both weighed. 139 
A comparison of the Second and Ninth Circuit tests reveals two 
fundamental differences. First, regardless of which test is used, the 
application of the act of state doctrine to these claims makes a 
133 818 F.2d at 1490-91, 1500-02. 
134 [d. at 1490. 
135 [d. 
136 [d. at 1490-91. 
137 [d. at 1491. 
138 [d. at 1500-01. 
139 See 806 F.2d at 355-56. 
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preliminary injunction a foregone conclusion. The doctrine, for 
reasons discussed supra,140 allows the Marcoses to evade a large part 
of the plaintiffs' claim. The second difference between the Circuits 
concerns the location of property in question. Whereas only New 
York property was involved in the Second Circuit case,141 property 
located throughout the world was at issue in the Ninth Circuit. 142 
While Judge Nelson persuasively argues in his dissent for the in-
junction, and in doing so draws from the Second Circuit's reasoning, 
he misses this distinction in location of the contested property.143 
For example, the Second Circuit concludes that the suit "was 
brought in the Southern District [of New York] only because the 
real estate is located here,"144 implying that property located else-
where may have been beyond its jurisdiction. In the Ninth Circuit, 
much of the property was in California, but some was also located 
abroad. 145 This point was raised by the majority as a reason for 
invoking the act of state doctrine. 146 However, the injunction could 
have been limited by the court to property over which it believed it 
had jurisdiction to avoid this concern. 
Judge Nelson pointed out a basic weakness in the analyses of 
Judges Hall and Kozinski. The majority limited their analyses to 
the RICO claims, yet RICO was not used as a basis for the district 
court's preliminary injunction. 147 Judge Nelson based his injunction 
analysis instead on the pendent claims only.148 A test for injunctive 
relief based on RICO is improper here since RICO was only used 
to establish subject matter jurisdiction. 
The "effect" and "conduct" tests employed by the majority also 
fail to consider the probability of harm to the plaintiffs to a proper 
extent. The Second Circuit in its analysis used the constructive trust 
as an equitable tool to balance the harm that would come to the 
Philippines' case if the Marcoses were allowed to transfer the prop-
erty in question. 149 By contrast, the majority in the Ninth Circuit 
case considered the alleged harm the plaintiffs may suffer to be 
140 See supra text accompanying notes 54-55. 
141 806 F.2d at 347. 
142 818 F.2d at 1476. 
143 [d. at 1500-02. 
144 806 F.2d at 36l. 
145 818 F.2d at 1476. 
146 [d. at 1490. 
147 [d. at 1477. 
148 [d. at 1500. 
149 806 F.2d at 355. 
1989] THE MARCOS CASES 103 
barred from relief by the act of state doctrine. 150 Given the political 
realities contained in the Armacost declaration,151 an equitable per-
spective is the proper test and is especially important in cases with 
such important political ramifications as these. At this stage of the 
litigation, a preliminary injunction would not hurt the Marcoses, 152 
nor would it preclude the district court from bowing to Philippine 
courts in the future. 153 It also allows the court to take into account 
new facts as the proof develops, including the issue of whether 
these suits do rest on official acts. 154 
It is also important to note that many courts have held that the 
merits of an act of state doctrine defense should not be decided in 
reviewing a grant of preliminary relief. 155 This principle was made 
clear in the case of Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger. 156 In Ramirez, 
the district court had dismissed on act of state grounds a complaint 
alleging the unlawful seizure and destruction of a private cattle 
ranch in Honduras. The circuit court reversed because the factual 
record was insufficient to permit dismissal at the pleading stage. In 
doing so, the circuit court observed: 
To the extent crucial facts pertaining to the defense are dis-
puted, or not fully developed in a complete record, the review-
ing court must be certain that it does not leap to conclusions 
arguable under the unelaborated pleadings but which could be 
refuted through the ordinary process of discovery and factfind-
ing in the district court. To do otherwise is to deny the claimant 
an opportunity to prove his case. 157 
Thus, the act of state doctrine is usually considered as a defense 
applicable only in a case with a well developed record. 
The Ninth Circuit did not adhere to this principle in its deci-
sion. The Ninth Circuit instead went beyond the factual record as 
150 818 F.2d at 1490. 
151 See supra text accompanying notes 105-08. 
152 818 F.2d at 1502. This conclusion is based on facts disclosed in Judge Nelson's dissent. 
Judge Nelson observed that the Marcoses objected to the forum and not the freezing of their 
assets. Also, the District Court's injunction allowed the Marcoses to obtain funds for legal 
fees and living expenses. A bond was also secured by the Philippine government to reimburse 
the Marcoses in the event that the injunction was wrongfully given. Therefore, the Marcoses 
would suffer little if at all from such an injunction. 
153 806 F.2d at 356, 360. 
154 [d. at 361. 
155 See Northrop v. McDonnell Douglas, 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 
849 (1983). 
156 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984), judgment vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985), 
on remand, 788 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
157 745 F.2d at 1534. 
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it existed to discuss and apply the act of state doctrine to the case 
on the behalf of the Marcoses. Thus, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning 
in Marcos concerning the act of state doctrine at the preliminary 
injunction stage is at odds with the precedent in many circuits, 
including the Ninth.15s By contrast, the New York Federal District 
Court in its Marcos case followed precedent and ruled that the act 
of state defense was no bar to preliminary relief. 159 The Ninth 
Circuit's improper invocation of the act of state doctrine as a defense 
therefore clouded its perspective of the test and grounds for a 
preliminary injunction. 
B. Forum Non Conveniens and the Situs of Property 
The issue of forum non conveniens in the Ninth Circuit Marcos 
case was to be ruled on by the district court at a later date. 160 It was 
raised without success as a defense in the Second Circuit litigation 
but is of greater relevance to the Ninth Circuit case. 
Forum non conveniens is a principle that "where, in a broad sense, 
the ends of justice strongly indicate that the controversy may be 
more suitably tried elsewhere, jurisdiction should be declined and 
the parties relegated to relief to be sought in another forum."161 
The principle similarly applies when litigation can more appropri-
ately be conducted in a foreign tribunal. I62 Thus the courts in the 
Marcos cases had the discretion to refrain from adjudicating the 
cases on forum non conveniens grounds. 
This is especially true of the Ninth Circuit, particularly in light 
of Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi. 163 In Pahlavi, the Iranian gov-
ernment brought suit to recover the assets of the deposed Shah, 
charging him with years of misrule. Specifically, the in personam 
action l64 against the Shah and his wife, who were living in New 
158 See Northrop v. McDonnell Douglas, 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1983). 
159 New York Land Co. v. Republic of Philippines, 634 F. Supp. 279, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), 
aff'd sub nom. Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986). 
160 818 F.2d at 1497 n.7. 
161 BALLANTINE's LAW DICTIONARY 493 (3d ed. 1969). See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, 
supra note 22, at 105-08. 
162 BALLANTINE's LAW DICTIONARY 493 (3d ed. 1969). 
163 62 N.Y.2d 474, 478 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985). 
164 An in personam action is an action having the objective of a judgment against the 
person, as distinguished from ajudgment against property; it is an action to enforce personal 
rights and obligations brought against the person and based on jurisdiction of the person, 
notwithstanding that it may involve his/her right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific 
property, or seek to compel him/her to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate 
of the court. BALLANTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 632 (3d ed. 1969). 
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York, alleged that they had accepted bribes, misappropriated funds, 
and either embezzled or converted billions of dollars that belonged 
to the national treasury.l65 The United States had agreed in the 
Algerian Accords l66 to inform American courts that these defenses 
were precluded in litigation between Iran and the Shah's estate. l67 
The court dismissed the suit onforum non conveniens grounds. l68 
The court stated that the burden was on the defendant to show 
relevant public and private interest factors for the principle to 
apply.l69 The court also identified five factors to consider in weigh-
ing the application offorum non conveniens: the burden on New York 
courts, the potential hardship for the defendant (such as in gath-
ering witnesses and evidence), the unavailability of an alternative 
forum, the residency of both parties, and the location of the trans-
action. l70 In light of these factors, the plaintiff's claims invited dis-
missal because they sought, in essence, "a sweeping review of the 
political and financial management of the Iranian government dur-
ing the several years of the late Shah's reign with the object of 
accounting for and repossessing the nation's claimed lost wealth 
wherever it may be located throughout the world."l7l In short, the 
plaintiff's claims, which did involve property located throughout 
the world, provided too small a nexus with the New York forum to 
allow the suit to continue. I72 There was simply too much foreign 
property, too large an administrative cost, too much evidence and 
too many witnesses outside of New York, and, overall, too ephem-
eral a connection with New York to allow the suit to continue. 
A strong dissent in the case argued that in weighing the forum 
non conveniens principle the availability of an alternative forum must 
be a requirement and not just a consideration, as the majority 
indicated. I73 The dissent cited the Second Restatement of the Con-
flicts of Laws as well as prior case history to support its contention 
that an alternative must be available to the plaintiffs before forum 
non conveniens can be applied. l74 In the Pahlavi case, New York was 
165 62 N.Y.2d at 477-78, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 599. 
166 Algiers Accords, reprinted in 20 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 223 (1981). 
167Id. 
168 62 N.Y.2d at 487,478 N.Y.S.2d at 605. 
169 62 N.Y.2d at 479,478 N.Y.S.2d at 600. 
17°Id. 
171 62 N.Y.2d at 483, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 602. 
172/d. 
173 62 N.Y.2d at 487-88,478 N.Y.S.2d at 605. 
174Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 84 (1971). 
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perhaps the only available forum because of a confluence of some 
of the property, witnesses and evidence there and nowhere else. 
A sequel to the Pahlavi case reaffirmed its holding. Also titled 
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi,175 the second case involved a 
reformulation of Iran's complaint from the first case to focus on 
specific New York property as well as other worldwide assets. 176 The 
court also dismissed this suit on forum non conveniens grounds, stating 
the fact that some of the Shah's assets were in New York was not 
enough to distinguish the instant case from the prior one. 177 
The Pahlavi cases were used to support a forum non conveniens 
defense advanced by the defendants in the Second Circuit Marcos 
case. The Second Circuit court distinguished the first Pahlavi case 
by noting that the questioned assets in that case were located 
throughout the world, not just in New York as in the Marcos case. 178 
The Second Circuit concluded its opinion by stating that "[t]his 
action is merely ancillary to an eventual Philippine decree or judg-
ment and was brought in the Southern District only because the 
real estate is located here."179 The Marcos court also approvingly 
cited District Court Judge Leval's opinion in Marcos that the Phil-
ippines only sought a recognition of its decree freezing various 
assets, and that the district court would not have to try the basic 
issues of the Marcoses' alleged wrongdoings. ISO Since the Second 
Circuit did not address the second Pahlavi case, Judge Leval's dis-
tinction cited by the Second Circuit presumably distinguishes the 
second Pahlavi case sufficiently. The Second Circuit's failure to 
address the second Pahlavi case was asserted as error by the defen-
dants in their appeal to the Supreme Court. lsl However, Judge 
Leval's distinction shows that both Pahlavi cases considered the 
alleged crimes as part of the claim before the court, yet in the case 
before the Second Circuit, the alleged crimes were ancillary.IS2 
In contrast to the Second Circuit's Marcos proceedings, the 
forum non conveniens principle and the Pahlavi cases were barely 
175 473 N.Y.S.2d 801 (App. Div. 1984), a/I'd, 64 N.Y.2d 831, 486 N.Y.S.2d 939 (1985). 
176Id. at 802. The defendant was the Shah's sister in the second case and not his wife as 
in the first case. 
I77 Id. 
178 806 F.2d at 361. 
179Id. 
18°Id. 
181 Brief for Appellant at 26-29, New York Land Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, cert. 
denied, 107 S.Ct. 2178 (1987). 
182 806 F.2d at 361. 
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discussed in the Ninth Circuit Marcos opinion, as this issue was to 
be heard by the district court at a later date. The Pahlavi cases are 
strong precedent for an outright dismissal of the Ninth Circuit 
Philippine claim on forum non conveniens grounds. 
The similarities between the Pahlavi cases and the Marcos case 
in the Ninth Circuit are remarkable. In both cases, new govern-
ments sought to recover private property located throughout the 
world by proving that the property was unlawfully taken or obtained 
by corrupt rulers.183 While the Pahlavi cases do not necessarily 
dictate dismissal of the Philippine claims, they persuasively support 
such a decision. Applying the five part test for forum non conveniens 
advanced in the first Pahlavi case to the Ninth Circuit Marcos case, 
it is arguable whether the principle should apply to the Marcoses, 
as strong arguments can be made on both sides of the issue. 
For example, the availability of an alternative forum depends 
on the location of a majority of the property and the location of 
witnesses and evidence. Also, the administrative burden on the 
California courts created by the Marcos case would be great, but it 
would be on any court for such complex litigation. The hardship 
for the defendants could be great, depending on the location of 
witnesses and evidence. Also, since many of the transactions oc-
curred in foreign jurisdictions, the court may have a difficult time 
controlling witnesses and evidence concerning these transactions. 
An argument for jurisdiction of these claims could rely on the 
Second Restatement of the Conflicts of Laws and precedent to show 
that an alternative forum must be made available to the plaintiffs 
before forum non conveniens can be applied. Thus, in short, the use 
of forum non conveniens here would be a subjective but reasonable 
decision. As in the Pahlavi cases, there are strong reasons for dis-
missing the case on this ground. However, if no alternative forum 
exists, the court could adopt the opinion of the dissent in the first 
Pahlavi case and accept jurisdiction. 
The situs of property is an issue that pervades both application 
of the forum non conveniens principle as well as the act of state 
doctrine. Because it is especially important in nationalization dis-
putes, most of the precedent in this area concerns nationalization. 
Regardless, these cases are relevant to the Marcos proceedings be-
cause they highlight the relationship between jurisdiction and the 
location of property. 
183 Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d at 477-78, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 599, Marcos, 818 F.2d at 1474-76. 
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The relationship is clearest in the case of Bandes v. Harlow & 
Jones, Inc. 184 The plaintiff was the owner ofa business in Nicaragua 
that was nationalized by the Sandinistas. The plaintiff ordered and 
paid for goods from the American defendant that were never de-
livered because of the revolution. The plaintiff sought return of his 
money. The Nicaraguan government also sought the money, claim-
ing it was now the operator of the plaintiff's business. In addressing 
the jurisdiction issue, the court relied on precedent to distinguish 
between property inside and outside of the jurisdiction. 185 The court 
noted that when the property at issue is within the jurisdiction of a 
foreign government, the act of state doctrine counsels a hands-off 
approach to the matter. 186 By contrast, when the contested property 
is in the United States, courts can exercise control over the property 
and the issues arising from it. 187 
This distinction is also evident in the case of Republic of Iraq v. 
First National City Bank (Citibank).188 In Citibank, the Iraqi govern-
ment brought suit to recover alleged assets of deposed King Faisal 
II that were allegedly obtained illegally. The court adjudicated the 
claim because the property involved was located in the United 
States. The court, however, refused to give effect to the claim, 
observing that confiscation was contrary to American policy and 
laws. 189 The court also emphasized that the discretionary issue of 
whether foreign acts of state should be honored is closely tied to 
our foreign affairs, therefore requiring national uniformity.190 
This requirement emphasizes the importance of the location of 
the disputed property to jurisdiction. Since the property in Citibank 
was in the United States, that court was able to define parameters 
and requirements by which the property could have been trans-
ferred. If the property in Citibank were abroad, the court would 
have been precluded from adjudicating the matter because of the 
lack of contacts with the forum and the act of state doctrine. 
While the Marcos proceedings did not involve confiscation de-
crees per se, the distinction between local and foreign property was 
apparent. In the Second Circujt Marcos case, all the contested prop-
erty was in the forum, so forum non conveniens and unfairness con-
184 570 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N .Y. 1983). 
185 [d. at 960. See infra text accompanying notes 186-87. 
186 [d. (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 431 (1964». 
187 [d. (citing Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47,51 (2d Cir. 1965». 
188 353 F.2d 47 [hereinafter Citibank]. 
189 [d. at 51. 
190 [d. at 50. 
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cerns were not raised. In the Ninth Circuit Marcos case, some of the 
contested property was abroad, so that court's jurisdiction could be 
questioned. Clearly, then, the situs of the property is, and has been, 
a legitimate concern in establishing jurisdiction in cases like the 
Marcos cases. 
VI. PURSUING THE ASSETS OF FLEEING DICTATORS 
While the Marcos proceedings may appear to be unusual upon 
initial consideration, they are merely two incidents in a developing 
area of law and history. Some of the cases discussed previously, such 
as Jimenez, Citibank and Banco de Espana, for example, ]lustrate that 
the pursuit of assets of fleeing dictators is a recurring historical 
phenomenon. Indeed, in the past ten years alone the Shah of Iran, 
Anastasio Somoza and Jean-Claude Duvalier preceded the Marcoses 
as fallen leaders under legal siege. 191 
The increasing frequency with which the assets of deposed 
dictators are sought emphasizes the need for the legal system to 
develop the adequate means to handle such litigation. The Marcos 
cases, although strong examples of skilled, highly creative lawyer-
ing, highlight the need for more expansive laws and doctrines to 
deal with such cases. 
Commentators are beginning to take notice of the problem. 
The American Society of International Law brought together ex-
perts to discuss the pursuit of assets of deposed dictators at its 1987 
conference. 192 Richard Falk, professor at Princeton University, 
noted that crimes such as those that the Marcoses were accused of 
are an ancient practice. 193 Whereas in ancient times stolen wealth 
was recycled in the community, today wealth has great mobility, and 
is often transferred to distant countries. 194 Thus, what was once a 
problem limited to politically unstable areas is now a problem for 
all countries, especially those attracting investment. 
191 For an example of litigation concerning the Shah. see supra text accompanying notes 
163-77. For an example of litigation concerning Duvalier, see Republic of Haiti v. Crown 
Charter, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Fla. 1987). But see Ope Shipping, Ltd. v. Allstate 
Insurance Co., Inc., 687 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983), for 
litigation concerning Somoza. 
192 American Society of International Law 1987 Conference (April 9-11, 1987). 
193 R. Falk, Remarks at the American Society of International Law 1987 Conference 
(April 9-11, 1987). 
194 [d. As an example, Falk described how grave robbers of the Egyptian pyramids only 
circulated their wealth in the immediate area and not worldwide as contemporary thieves 
often do. 
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Falk noted that in addition to billions of dollars being involved, 
the dignity of those who suffer from these crimes is similarly at 
stake. 195 Actions such as the Marcoses' involve entire societies be-
cause these crimes remove billions of dollars from victimized soci-
eties where median incomes are only a few hundred dollars. This 
observation was reflected in the comments of Peter Weiss, a lawyer 
for the Philippines in the Marcos cases. 196 Weiss stated that the 
Marcos cases were not property disputes but human rights cases. 197 
As such, Weiss saw the cases as an extension of the Filartiga prin-
ciple, which applies international law to violations of human rights 
principles in domestic courts. 198 Weiss considered the alleged de-
predations of the Marcoses as "the rape of an entire nation" and 
therefore appropriate to the Filartiga principle. 199 
While Weiss' observations may be considered extreme, they 
nevertheless highlight the need for new law to be developed for 
these types of cases. The charges in the Marcos cases, although 
affecting human rights, have greater repercussions. Weiss suggested 
that a confluence of human rights and economic theory is necessary 
in any future law for the pursuit of deposed dictators' assets.200 
Weiss also suggested that new law must be a "third generation of 
rights": rights of people to their collective wealth, to economic 
development, and a right not to be exploited.201 Abram Chayes, 
professor at Harvard Law School and an advisor to the Philippine 
Commission on Good Government, generally suggested that there 
is room for an international treaty or convention concerning de-
posed dictator's assets, even though some countries with dictators 
presumably would not sign.202 
Whatever new laws, treaties or conventions arise in this area, 
the Marcos proceedings will certainly have some effect. It is too soon 
to say what that effect will be. As attorney Weiss stated, the "Marcos 
principle" is presently "written in invisible ink."203 However, that 
195 [d. 
196 P. Weiss, Remarks at the American Society of International Law 1987 Conference 
(April 9-11, 1987). 
197 [d. 
198 [d. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888-889 (2d Cir. 1980). 
199 P. Weiss, Remarks at the American Society of International Law 1987 Conference 
(April 9-11, 1987). 
200 [d. 
201 [d. 
202 A. Chayes, Remarks at the American Society of International Law 1987 Conference 
(April 9-11, 1987). 
203 [d. (statement of Peter Weiss.) 
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principle should reveal itself when the next dictator falls and is sued 
for allegedly stealing a nation's assets. 
VII. USING THE IEEPA AGAINST DEPOSED DICTATORS 
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)204 
was passed in 1977 because of concerns that economic powers right-
fully belonging to the Congress had been usurped by the Presi-
dency.205 However, because the statute broadly and amorphously 
delegates powers to the President, it has been applied in a variety 
of circumstances.206 Because of its breadth, the IEEPA could have 
been used to freeze the contested American property in the Marcos 
cases,207 and could be used in future instances when the assets of 
deposed dictators are at issue. 
In substantive terms, the IEEPA grants the President broad 
powers. Section 1702(a) allows the President to, among other things, 
regulate or prohibit transactions in foreign exchange, transactions 
to banks involving foreign countries, the import or export of cur-
rency or securities, and virtually any use or transaction of property 
in which a foreign country or national has an interest. The President 
is only precluded from regulating and prohibiting postal, tele-
graphic or telephonic communications of a personal nature not 
involving property transfers and charitable donations to alleviate 
human suffering.208 Section 1701 allows the President to use these 
wide ranging powers "to deal with any unusual and extraordinary 
threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the 
United States, to the national security, foreign policy or economy 
of the United States." Section 1701 requires that a national emer-
gency be declared by the President to invoke the IEEPA. 
Taken together, sections 1701 and 1702 provide the President 
with virtually unrestrained powers. For example, the limitations of 
204 50 U .S.C. § § 1701-06 (1982). 
205 Note, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: A Congressional Attempt to Control 
Presidential Emergency Power, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1102 (1983) [hereinafter IEEPA note]. 
206 For example, the IEEPA was used to block Iranian government property in the United 
States, see Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. 325 (1979), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 at 148 
(1982), to block trade with Nicaragua, see Exec. Order No. 12,513, 3 C.F.R. 342 (1985), 
reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 at 661 (Supp. III 1985), South Africa, see Exec. Order No. 
12,532, 3 C.F.R. 387 (1985), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 at 661-62 (Supp. III- 1985), and 
Libya, see Exec. Order No. 12,543,3 C.F.R. 181 (1986), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 at 663-
64 (Supp. III 1985). 
207 This was suggested by Sevarina Rivera, counsel to the Republic of the Philippines, at 
the 1987 American Society of International Law conference. 
208 50 U.S.C. 1702(b) (1982). 
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section 1701 are virtually meaningless, since almost any world event 
affects the United States' national security, foreign policy or econ-
omy.209 The interdependence of world economics and politics is the 
reason for this. Similarly, the requirement of 1701 for a national 
emergency to be declared serves more as a formality than an im-
pediment, and exists merely for "conceptual tidiness."210 The dec-
laration of a national emergency is a simple matter, and when 
declared for the purposes of the IEEPA it has no other effect.211 
Thus, a national emergency declared under the IEEP A does not 
mean that emergency conditions necessarily exist in the United 
States. Rather, it is limited to the United States' relations with a 
foreign country. 
Section 1702 provides the President with an expansive list of 
powers. This is a necessity, since any statutory attempt to define an 
emergency must be broad, and, more importantly, the realm of 
national emergencies and foreign affairs is uniquely suited to the 
executive branch.212 The Supreme Court affirmed this position in 
interpreting the IEEPA. In Dames & Moore v. Regan,213 the Court 
held that the President was authorized by the IEEPA to order the 
transfer of Iranian assets as part of the Iranian hostage agree-
ment.214 The plaintiffs in Dames & Moore sought to prevent the 
enforcement of the executive orders and agreement with Iran for 
the release of the hostages. 215 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that 
the executive orders and agreements were unconstitutional because 
they adversely affected the plaintiffs' final judgment awarding writs 
of execution and garnishment against the Iranian government and 
the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.216 As well as relying on 
the IEEPA to reject this claim, the Supreme Court held that the 
action was not a taking under the fifth amendment.217 The Court 
also held that the President was authorized to suspend claims pur-
suant to executive orders because of the history of congressional 
209 IEEPA note, supra note 205, at 1115. 
210Id. 
211 However, the IEEPA is not exempted from § 201(b) of the National Emergencies Act, 
50 U.S.C.§ 1621(b) (1976), which applies to all emergency declarations unless explicitly 
exempted. 
212 IEEPA note, supra note 205, at 1112-14. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,211-
14 (1962) (citing cases). 
213 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
214 Id. at 669-74. 
215Id. at 666-67. 
216Id. at 667. 
217Id. at 674 n.6. 
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acquiescence in executive claims settlements. 218 Thus, with this ap-
proval from the Supreme Court, sections 1701 and 1702 of the 
IEEPA provide the Presidency with a powerful tool in foreign af-
fairs that will in most cases be deferred to by the judiciary. 
Procedurally, the IEEPA does place some limitations on the 
President. However, as in sections 1701 and 1702, these limitations 
are minor. For example, section 1703 requires that the President 
consult with the Congress "in every possible instance" before acting 
under the IEEPA, and provide the Congress with immediate and 
follow-up reports of his or her action. However, this requirement 
is problematic, since it allows the President to determine when prior 
consultation with Congress is possible, and does not specify who in 
Congress is to be consulted. 219 Thus this provision is more of a 
request than a requirement for consultation.220 The other proce-
dural requirement of the IEEPA is presumably no longer a require-
ment because a similar provision in another statute has been found 
unconstitutional. Section 1706(b) provides that a legislative veto by 
Congress can overturn the national emergency under the IEEPA. 
The Supreme Court however, in Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice v. Chadha,221 declared a similar legislative veto provision uncon-
stitutional on various grounds.222 Thus the procedural demands of 
the IEEPA on the President, along with the substantive demands of 
the statute, are minor, allowing the President broad discretion to 
determine when to apply the IEEPA and to what extent. 
Taking these broad powers into consideration along with the 
facts of the Marcos cases, it appears that the IEEPA should have 
been applied for two reasons. First, the importance of American-
Philippine relations strongly weighs in favor of applying the IEEPA. 
The Armacost declaration clearly sets out the military, economIC 
218Id. at 675-88. 
219 IEEPA note, supra note 205, at 1118-19. 
22°Id. at 1119. 
221 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
222 The Court in Chadha struck down the provision in § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U .S.c. 1254( c)(2), which authorized a house of Congress, by resolution, 
to invalidate an Executive Branch determination of an alien's status. The majority held that 
the legislative veto violated the presentment clause of the Constitution as weU as the principle 
of bicameralism. Id. at 946-59. However, in the IEEPA a concurrent resolution is required 
for the veto, so the bicameralism argument is not applicable. In his concurring opinion in 
Chadha, Justice PoweU ruled that the Executive Branch determination was an adjudication, 
consequently violating the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 960-67. This argument is 
also not applicable to the IEEPA. Nevertheless, it seems that the legislative veto provision of 
the IEEPA would fail a constitutional test because of its infringement on foreign affairs, an 
area traditionaUy within the auspices of the executive branch. 
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and social ties between the two countries and the strong interest of 
the United States in maintaining these ties. Since the Marcos litiga-
tion is vitally important to the Aquino government for monetary 
and credibility reasons, the cooperation of the American govern-
ment in the litigation would enhance Philippine-American relations. 
By applying the IEEPA to the Marcos litigation, the chances of 
Philippine success in the litigation would have been enhanced as 
the contested property could have been more easily frozen pending 
determination of ownership. Second, the symbolic importance of 
the IEEPA would have had some effect as well, since the Ninth 
Circuit in the Marcos case based its decision against the Aquino 
government in part on the silence of the American government in 
the case. Since the Aquino government has had some domestic 
difficulties in asserting its authority and establishing its effective-
ness, the application of the IEEPA to the Marcos cases could have 
heightened the Aquino government's domestic and international 
credibility. 
However, it must be remembered that the application of the 
IEEPA is a policy decision. The Departments of State and Justice 
are in a unique position to consider and evaluate the merits of a 
wealth of information before recommending the application of the 
IEEPA to the President. Since there is little publicly available infor-
mation to evaluate fully the Marcos cases, it is difficult to judge the 
government's position concerning the cases. 
What can be derived from the Marcos experience is that the 
IEEPA can and should be used in future instances of the pursuit 
of property of fallen third world dictators. The unique political and 
economic pressures that the statute can create make it a valuable 
tool in foreign affairs. While the fall of Ferdinand and Imelda 
Marcos and subsequent rise of Corazon Aquino were unique events, 
the abuse of governmental power by third world dictators is not. 
The IEEPA is not a panacea, but it can, under the proper circum-
stances, facilitate both the transfer of power from dictatorship to 
democracy as well as the pursuit of stolen assets. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Marcos cases are important for several reasons. The Second 
Circuit case revealed the need for a benefit test in determining the 
application of the act of state doctrine to deposed leaders. The 
Ninth Circuit case contained an incorrect interpretation of the act 
of state doctrine that highlighted the difficulty in distinguishing 
1989] THE MARCOS CASES 115 
between public and private acts of political leaders. The case also 
failed to develop a proper test for a preliminary injunction. 
The Marcos cases also illustrate the difficulty of recovering as-
sets stolen by deposed dictators. Principles such as the act of state 
doctrine and forum non conveniens can, in certain circumstances, 
preclude the recovery of stolen assets. Moreover, the great mobility 
of wealth today can preclude a court from having jurisdiction in an 
action to recover assets. 
On a larger scale, the cases reveal that the pursuit of the assets 
of a deposed dictator is not an isolated occurrence, but an increas-
ingly common phenomenon deserving of some treaty, convention 
or legislation. In the future, the IEEPA could be used to freeze the 
property of deposed dictators located in the United States in order 
to facilitate the adjudication of its ownership. The contribution of 
the Marcos cases to this developing body of law is uncertain, but will 
hopefully be a positive development. 
Adam C. Robitaille 
